Established in 2024, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) fundamentally changed how federal courts review agency interpretations of the law. Our previous piece on this topic summarized the history of deference to agencies by federal courts — starting before the Chevron era into the future implications of the Loper decision.
Earlier this year, the Supreme Court has issued two decisions that further define the contours of judicial review of administrative agency interpretations.
Case 1: Seven County Infrastructure Coalition (U.S. May 29, 2025)
This case (“Seven County”) centered on a proposed 88-mile railroad in northeastern Utah to transport crude oil to Gulf Coast refineries. The U.S. Surface Transportation Board (STB), the agency with authority over new rail construction, issued a 3,600-page Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). In the EIS, the STB Board declined to analyze the environmental effects of upstream oil drilling or downstream refining, citing a lack of statutory authority over those activities.
The Supreme Court upheld the STB’s discretion, holding that NEPA decisions receive “substantial judicial deference.” That deference extends not only to what environmental effects are considered but also to which project alternatives are evaluated and how feasibility is determined.
This rule demonstrates that even after Loper, not all forms of agency discretion are subject to strict judicial scrutiny. The Court rationalized that where the statute explicitly grants decision-making flexibility- particularly under broad, procedural statutes like NEPA, courts are still inclined to defer. Thus, Seven County seems to reflect a tailored approach to agency deference, where both the nature of the agency’s authority and the statute’s text guide the level of review, and that while Loper narrowed Chevron-style deference, it did not eliminate all deference to agencies, particularly in procedural or fact-bound contexts.
Case 2: McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corporation (U.S. June 20, 2025)
Petitioners in this case challenged the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) 2019 Amerifactors order, which interpreted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) to exclude online faxes from its scope. The FCC argued that online faxes do not implicate the harms the TCPA was designed to prevent—like tying up a fax machine or wasting paper and ink. The central legal issue of the McLaughlin case was whether the Hobbs Act—which grants exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts of appeals to review FCC orders—precludes district courts from reaching independent conclusions in enforcement actions.
The Supreme Court held that it does not. The Court’s majority concluded that unless Congress clearly states otherwise, district courts retain the authority to interpret statutes independently, even when an agency has already ruled. While FCC interpretations may be considered with “appropriate deference,” they are not binding on lower courts.
Contrasting with Seven County, this decision reinforces the post-Loper shift away from deference to agency statutory interpretations. It underscores the Court’s broader trend of judicial empowerment—giving district courts latitude to interpret statutes independently, even in areas historically dominated by federal agencies. The ruling is particularly significant for regulatory enforcement, as it may invite more challenges to formal agency interpretations and erode agencies’ ability to rely on earlier adjudicatory orders.
Analysis
Taken together, these decisions suggest that Loper marked not a blanket rejection of all agency deference but more of a recalibration. Courts will still defer where statutes clearly grant discretion to the agency, the nature of the law is procedural, or technical expertise is paramount (as in Seven County), but will assert interpretive primacy where Congress has not explicitly delegated binding authority (as in McLaughlin).
Nevertheless, these cases continue to illustrate a growing emphasis on statutory text, judicial independence, and limits on implied deference—a trend that is likely to shape administrative law for years to come.
Part I of this series, which discusses the history and early implications of Loper, is available here.
